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Monday, March 3, 2025

What Went Wrong With EVE Online's Equinox Sov Mining

On Friday CCP Games published a dev blog about mining. In recent years the company moved away from putting an individual employee's name on a dev blog in an effort to avoid a hostile player base descending on the author blaming them for all the game's ills. But the mining dev blog was published under the name CCP Okami. I did a little research and confirmed that CCP Okami is a real individual and not an artificial construct designed to attract fire away from the rest of the developers. Although drawing player anger may indeed be included in the duties of the Game Design Director on EVE Online. Here are the duties the job encompasses:

  • Collaborating with the Creative Director: They work closely with the Creative Director to understand and translate the design intent into actionable work for the team.
  • Leading the Design Team: They lead a team of system, technical, mission, and level designers, ensuring the quality and timely delivery of documentation, levels, UI changes, gameplay tuning, and balancing.
  • Maintaining Communication: They maintain communication and consistency with art, audio, and feature teams to ensure a cohesive game design.
  • Incorporating Feedback: They incorporate feedback from Live Ops and Production teams to align with the Creative Director’s vision.
  • Working with Monetization Team: They integrate monetization designs into core mechanics.
  • Ensuring Quality: They are responsible for driving high-quality feature implementation within the game vision and desired game “feel”

CCP Okami started working at CCP Games in February 2024, meaning they are the veteran of two expansions, Equinox and Revenant. An important note as the mineral price index spiked with the launch of Revenant in November 2024.

From the January 2025 Monthly Economic Report

I want to address what appears a terminology issue. Equinox is both an expansion and the name of the feature set the developers implemented to drive gameplay under "Equinox sov". I believe during the dev blog CCP Okami is referring to the entire sovereignty gameplay system.

So, what happened to produce that big spike in the mineral price index with the launch of Revenant? One factor was the developers' wish to bring flexibility to player-owned null sec. Some of the goals included:

  • We wanted to give Nullsec more flexibility and choice. 
  • We needed to make sure that more flexibility was balanced against the rest of the universe. 
  • We needed to account for different play styles. 
  • We wanted to make beautiful, science fiction space rocks for you to enjoy. 

The goals sound nice. The implementation possibly left something to be desired. According to CCP Okami, the devs made the following changes to implement flexibility.

  • We introduced Tier 1 and Tier 2 mining Upgrades that allowed Sovereignty system owners to choose which ore types spawned in their owned space. 
  • We made more ores available in Nullsec, with greater amounts of flexibility and choice via. Sov Hub Upgrades. 
  • We introduced new ores in these sites that were curated for Equinox’s flexibility. 
  • The sites had more asteroids with lower amounts and low to medium volume. 
At this point I think CCP Okami was a bit confusing with the use of the terms ore and minerals, which might have resulted from the editing process. For years the devs worked to make each security band dominant in certain minerals. With Equinox sov mechanics that separation disappeared, at least for player-owned null sec. The minerals removed from ores in high and low security space would not return at the same time. So in theory, the mineral supply should increase. So what happened?

A major problem was the creation of the new Equinox mining upgrades. The design challenge was to make cherry-picking the valuable ore and leaving the lower-value ores until last a memory. With the seven sets of sites the dev team created for Equinox sov they had two design priorities.

  1. They needed to get the majority of their value from a single mineral type, as their site was meant to be a specific Upgrade choice an organization made for their system. This could mean being 100% made up of that one mineral or being mostly made up of that mineral with a few traces of some others. 

  2. They needed an appropriate ISK/m3 value to be placed in large quantities in sites that would spawn in large numbers (ie. they needed to be a fairly standard ore, not a super special jackpot ore) 

I do want to point out that CCP hired CCP Okami in February 2024, long before the resource distribution update of 2020 which divided minerals into security bands. So instead of putting minerals back into ore, the developers created five new types of ores specific to spawned sites in null security space. I guess the designers were focusing on improving null security space and forgot actions in one area of space impact the entire game. CCP Okami's rundown of the issues that cropped up leads me to that conclusion.
The first is that we couldn’t fully anticipate the correct distribution and choices of Upgrades and sites across the universe and what total percentage of maximum ore volume generated by the sites per day would be mined. That had a significant impact on how the overall value of these sites was being calculated and has led to a clear impact in how minerals are being mined. Next, many of these sites were actually balanced to be more valuable than previous sites. However, due to how the rocks were distributed and placed in the sites it meant that there was also an increase in micromanagement, effort and labor which leads to both a tangible felt decrease in value and a shift in paradigm that’s been regarded as a confusing change. This was done to both try and support a broader variety of playstyles and also for some aesthetic factors.
I want to state that the design goal, in a broad sense, to support a broader variety of playstyles succeeded. But mining playstyles? Not so much.
Another unintended challenge that arose is that effectively when it comes to choosing an activity in Nullsec, the ISK/hour and relative effort of ratting makes it an obvious choice in comparison to mining which has higher labor and, in some cases, offers lower ISK/hour. This has driven more people away from mining and into ratting, which means that our estimates on mining value are off even more, since we weren’t accounting for this shift in work.
The change in the size of asteroids highly contributed to the increase in labor. From my perspective from mining in low sec for years, the smaller asteroid size also means paying more attention to the mechanics of mining and less to things like observing the environment and detecting possible threats. Not an issue for fleets, but for solo or small-gang mining, possibly an issue.

My well-known allergy to bubbles kept me from thinking of the final issue EVE's Game Design Director mentioned.
Finally, we’re able to start measuring the real impact of the Metenox in the game ecosystem more thoroughly, which highlights some unintended side effects and challenges. The high ROI of Metenox's in lower and mid-tier moons, combined with its inability to extract regular ores, has contributed to the current increase in the Pyerite price, as moon mining is no longer able to supply the market with that ore.
A funny thing about the mineral affected by the 2020 resource distribution play: pyerite and mexallon. They were not included in the redistribution, at least not directly.

How the devs rearranged distribution in 2020

Is there an institutional disregard for pyerite as a common mineral? I also don't know if the 2020 changes removed ore from null sec high in pyerite, meaning the Metenox change had a far greater impact than it would in pre-2020 New Eden.

CCP Okami also addressed another issue: messaging.
I also want to touch on our messaging. I want to acknowledge that we didn’t do a great job of conveying the vision of Equinox to you all and leaned in on things like “rejuvenating” or “more wealth”, which is confusing when things don’t feel like they’re lining up that way for the average person playing out there. Our goals were more around flexibility and self-sustainability, as well as creating long-term systemic levers that we could develop onto for years to come. We definitely learned a lesson here, and we’ll work on better rolling out and being transparent with our feature visions in the future. 
I will admit I like the idea of developers striving to produce better communications. I can recall other times, like during the Chaos Era, where providing information to players about development goals was considered a bad thing. Perhaps I've spent too much time playing Final Fantasy XIV and listening to Yoshi-P try to keep the player-base informed about upcoming developments. But I really prefer openness in development where possible.

Finally, I'd like to end with a conclusion CCP Okami came to about the whole experience.
Hindsight is 20/20 and we can totally see where we made our missteps. While the intention was sound, our hypotheses and estimates didn’t work out and lead us to our high MPI that we have today. I personally have a lot of learning around how to better work with you folks around messaging our intentions around big, systemic reworks and I’m going to be way more in touch with you all as we roll out changes and updates like this. 

Saturday, March 1, 2025

Cloud Imperium February 2025 Year-Over-Year Sales Revenue Up 61.6%

Cloud Imperium Games had a smashing month of sales from its online cash shop in February according to data from the CCU Game dashboard. February's $7.7 million in sales was a 61.6% year-over-year increase over the $4.8 million recorded in February 2024.


The $789.5 million displayed on the Roberts Space Industries funding page at the end of February was not a comprehensive accounting for all of CIG's revenue since the project's Kickstarter in October 2012. Overall, the company has recorded $888.1 million in confirmed revenue (the funding page & the 2022 financial report).
  • Sales/Pledges: $789.5 million (through 28 February 2025)
  • Subscriptions: $33.0 million (through 31 December 2022)
  • All other sources: $65.6 million (through 31 December 2022)
In addition, the company has received a total of $63.25 million in outside investment. According to the 2022 financial report, $4.8 million of the amount was returned to investors in 2020. Including the outside investment money, the total amount raised by CIG to create Squadron 42 and Star Citizen is $951.4 million, or $946.6 million when excluding the returned funds. An additional $5 million in shares sold in January 2025 are not included in the total.

The Funding Plateau - Over the last three years, Cloud Imperium has faced a sales plateau in the company's sales of virtual good like internet spaceships. Sales have fallen withing 3% of the average of $115.9 million between 2022-2024. I believe the shakeup of upper management that began in Q4 of 2024 is designed to break through and increase revenue for the company. So in addition to providing year-over-year metrics I will also comparing the previous month's sales to the average sales for the month from the years 2022-2024. I believe if sales continue to fall within the range of $112.4 million and $119.4 million the C-Suite at CIG, if not the board of directors, will not be happy.

In February the Marketing Masters In Manchester had a lot to smile about. Not only did sales rise 61.6% YoY, but increased over the previous 3-year average for January by 41.5%. Sales really benefitted from the continued effects of the release of Alpha 4.0.1 on 28 January and the accompanying sale of both the MISC Fortune and the Red Letter event. Over the first seven days of February, the company recorded an additional $1.6 million in sales, a $900,000 increase over sales in the first seven days of February 2024.

Additionally the Coramor event, Star Citizen's version of Valentine's Day, did quite well financially. 


Featuring the introductory sale of the Super Hornet MK II as well as the Anvil F7C-M, CIG racked up $3.5 million in sales over the course of 7 days as compared to 2024's total of $1.8 million. Combined, the sales held in the first seven days of the month combined with the Valentine's event accounted for approximately $2.7 million of the $2.9 million year-over-year sales increase in February.

New Account Creation - From 2022 to 2024 CIG saw the number of new accounts created each year fall by 44.5%. I'm assuming that part of the shakeup is aimed at improving that performance as well. So I came up with a simple predictive formula to estimate how big of a drop in new player account creation is expected based on historical trends. For the year, my formula comes up with a 19% drop in new user accounts created in 2025, which is twice as much as I predicted at the beginning of the year.


The number of accounts created fell by 40.9% year-over-year, from 44,060 in February 2024 down to 26,057 last month. While part of the drop is attributable to the cancellation of the Red Letter Festival's free-fly event at the beginning of the month, the marketing department is not attracting many new accounts. I have to wonder if the plan for 2025 is to not go all out to attract new players given the bad technical state Star Citizen currently faces. Instead the marketing tactics seem aimed at extracting increasing amounts of revenue from the game's whales. 

Ongoing Concerns - I did not see any progress on my list of concerns at the end of January. The big question going into March is whether the Calders will exercise their put option in 2025 or wait until the first quarter of 2028. The father and son duo have until no later than the end of March to exercise the option. While I fully expect the Calders to choose to wait another three years in order to benefit from the release of Squadron 42, I see a non-zero chance of the second largest shareholders pulling the trigger.

Another concern is the lack of financial information for 2023 available. Yes, the month of March has arrived and still no financial report posted to the CIG corporate website. With my experience covering CCP Games the lack of posting information is a bit puzzling. The Icelandic studio only stopped posting financial information on its corporate website when it briefly didn't have outside investors or was bought by Pearl Abyss. I really don't see either condition existing at the moment. 

In fact, the company issued another $5 million shares in the company in the middle of January. I really would like to know who obtained the shares, but that information probably will not become public until September.

A bigger concern is the late filing of CIG's accounts to UK Companies House. For the second year in a row the filings will occur after the 31 December deadline. The 2022 filings showed some issues with the accounts from the new auditors, including accessing the liability for the put options for 2024, 2025, and 2028 correctly.

Currently the company is facing a fine of £750 for filing its accounts late for the second year in a row. If the accounts are filed after 31 March, the fine increases to £1500. If Companies House chooses to do so, directors of the company could face criminal charges.

One final note on the late filing of the financial accounts with Companies House. The 2022 accounts were signed and dated on 1 March 2024, electronically submitted to Companies House on 3 March, and posted to the Companies House website on 11 March. I am interested to see if history repeats itself.